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Abstract
Two experiments show that repeated exposure to information about a target person reduces individuation and thereby increases
stereotyping of the target person based on social group memberships. The eVect is not due to familiarity-induced liking (the mere
exposure eVect), nor is it mediated by increased accessibility of the target’s social category, nor by increases in perceived social judge-
ability. The results are most consistent with the use of feelings of familiarity as a regulator of processing mode, such that familiar
objects receive less systematic or analytic processing. In everyday life, frequent exposure to another person ordinarily produces not
only familiarity but also liking, individuated knowledge, and friendship, factors that may eVectively limit stereotyping. But when pre-
vious exposure is unconfounded from these other factors, its eVect can be to increase stereotyping.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Familiarity; Stereotyping; Person perception; Sytematic and heuristic processingWhen people make decisions or judgments about
other people, social groups, or other objects, sometimes
they search with relative thoroughness for relevant
information, combine the information appropriately,
and arrive at a reasoned judgment. This type of system-
atic or thoughtful processing takes place when people
possess both high ability (e.g., adequate information,
freedom from distraction) and high motivation (e.g., due
to the object’s self-relevance). When ability or motiva-
 Thanks to Sara McAllister, Michèle Banner, and Heather Claypool
for research assistance. This work was supported by National Science
Foundation grants BCS-0091807 and SBR-9209995, National Institute
of Mental Health grants K02 MH01178 and R01 MH63762, and Fun-
dação para a Ciência e Tecnologia Plurianual program ID332.
* Corresponding author. Present address: Department of Psycholo-
gy, Indiana University, 1101 E. Tenth St., Bloomington, IN 47405-
7007, USA.
E-mail address: esmith4@indiana.edu (E.R. Smith).
1 Present address: Indiana University-Purdue University Fort
Wayne, USA.0022-1031/$ - see front matter © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.07.002tion are lacking, people often engage in a much less
eVortful style of processing, based on simple cues or heu-
ristics that allow them to assess an object or make a
judgment with a minimum of time and thought. Dual-
process models elaborating these assumptions have been
developed and applied in a number of diVerent areas
within social and cognitive psychology in the last couple
of decades (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996;
Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
Factors other than motivation and ability can also
determine how people process information, and there-
fore the content of the judgments they ultimately make.
One important factor is previous exposure to the target
of processing. When people make judgments about
objects that they have encountered previously, they tend
to engage in lower levels of eVortful, systematic process-
ing (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000, 2001; Johnston &
Hawley, 1994). This tendency is adaptive because our
processing capacity is limited and we encounter a myriad
of objects each day. It would be wasteful for us to think
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have encountered in the past, because readily accessible
knowledge should suYce to deal with these familiar
objects. Instead, people should reserve extensive and
thoughtful processing mostly for novel objects and situ-
ations.
Empirical evidence in several domains supports this
hypothesis. Reder and Ritter (1992), studying problem
solving, presented students with problems that were
either novel or highly similar to previously-presented
problems. If similar problems had been previously seen,
the students tended to try to retrieve the answer (a rela-
tively less eVortful approach that draws on stored
knowledge) rather than to eVortfully compute an
answer. In contrast, novel problems produced more
eVortful processing and less use of the retrieval-based
strategy. Within social psychology, evidence supporting
the same hypothesis comes from studies of participants
processing persuasive messages. A persuasive message
that participants have encountered previously is
processed less analytically than the same message
encountered for the Wrst time (Claypool, Mackie, Gar-
cia-Marques, McIntosh, & Udall, 2004; Garcia-Marques
& Mackie, 2001; although see Cacioppo & Petty, 1976).
In the area of person perception, the idea that previous
exposure diminishes extensive analytic processing implies
a strikingly counterintuitive prediction. In this domain
eVortful processes of individuation have often been con-
trasted with heuristic or non-analytic processes of stereo-
typing or category-based processing (Brewer, 1988; Fiske
& Neuburg, 1990). There is considerable evidence that the
“default” mode of person perception in the absence of
either motivation or capacity is stereotyping, and that
motivation and capacity tend to increase perceivers’ use of
individuating information (see Fiske, 1998). Intuitively,
repeated exposure might be expected to increase the
capacity to process information about the person and
(perhaps) to increase motivation as well, allowing for
greater individuation. Our prediction, however, is that
previous exposure to information about a target person
should decrease analytic processing of individuating infor-
mation, thereby increasing the perceiver’s reliance on ste-
reotypes in making judgments about the target.
We hasten to add that one would not expect previous
exposure to have this eVect in many real-life relation-
ships, because repeated encounters with a person should
generally lead to increases in aVective ties, depth of
friendship, amount of individuated knowledge, and
interpersonal interdependence. All these factors should,
of course, motivate and enable individuated processing
and thereby reduce stereotyping. However, in the labora-
tory, exposure can be experimentally unconfounded
from these other factors. Equally important, “mere
exposure” sometimes occurs in everyday life as well,
because one might frequently see another person with-
out engaging in meaningful interaction or forming anactual relationship. For example, one might frequently
see someone who rides the same bus in the morning,
works as a janitor in one’s workplace, or (like a fast-food
cashier) engages only in minimal, highly scripted interac-
tions. In such cases, if repeated exposure indeed reduces
analytic processing, we would expect increased stereo-
typing of familiar target persons, because this eVect
would not be counteracted by individuated knowledge,
emotional involvement, and so forth.
Perceivers may obtain many diVerent types of infor-
mation about a target person (e.g., visual appearance,
behaviors, verbal trait self-descriptions, etc.). What spe-
ciWc types of information, if repeated, might be predicted
to lead to reduced analytic processing and hence
increased stereotyping? Conceptually, the answer is that
repetition of any part of the person information should
cause this eVect. Imagine, for example, a perceiver who
obtains both visual-appearance and behavioral informa-
tion about a target person. If either of these subsets of
the information had been previously encountered, heu-
ristic processing and greater stereotyping should result.
Note, though, that in studying this eVect one must be
careful to avoid a potential confound involving repeated
exposure to cues for the stereotyped category itself. That
is, a demonstration that repeated exposure to a target’s
visual appearance resulted in increased racial stereotyp-
ing would be of little interest. The stereotyping might not
be due to familiarity alone, but due to repeated exposure
to visual cues that indicate the person’s racial category
membership, making the category and its associated ste-
reotype more accessible. A clear test of the hypothesis
that repeated exposure per se increases stereotyping can
be provided only if the repeatedly exposed subset of the
information to be processed does not itself contain any
cues to the stereotype, avoiding this potential confound.
This paper reports two experiments testing the hypoth-
esis that repeated exposure increases the impact on social
judgments of social group stereotypes, relative to individ-
uating information. In Experiment 1, participants Wrst
brieXy viewed photographs of a number of individuals,
and then later saw some of those photos again, or compa-
rable new photos, paired with information about the tar-
gets’ occupations and behaviors. The photos (the repeated
information) contained no cues to the targets’ occupa-
tions. We expected that judgments about previously seen
targets would be more consistent with occupational ste-
reotypes, compared to judgments about novel targets.
Experiment 1
Participants
Participants were 44 introductory psychology stu-
dents at Purdue University, who received research par-
ticipation credit.
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The experiment had two phases. In phase 1, partici-
pants viewed 30 photos of male and female faces on a
computer monitor, each displayed for only 3 s. Partici-
pants were instructed to try to remember the faces,
which they were told would become relevant in an
unspeciWed way later in the experimental session.
During phase 2, which occurred directly after phase 1,
participants were presented sequentially with 12 person
descriptions. Each consisted of a photo of a face accom-
panied by a brief text description. Half of the photos
were previously viewed by the participants in phase 1
(old) and half were new. Which photos were repeated
and which were new were counterbalanced. The written
descriptions included occupation labels and individuat-
ing information that was constructed to be somewhat
inconsistent with the occupational stereotype. The occu-
pational stereotypes used were accountant, librarian,
artist, lawyer, professional boxer, hairdresser, stockbro-
ker, waitress, truck driver, judge, mountain climber, and
computer programmer. For each occupation, we chose
three traits related to the occupational stereotype, based
on informal pilot testing. For example, for the occupa-
tion of accountant, the stereotypic traits were boring,
meticulous, and serious. We then constructed a brief per-
son description that included somewhat counterstereo-
typical behaviors. Thus, the accountant description read:
“I am an accountant. I live in Chicago. I love living in a
big city because there is always something to do (ball-
games, concerts, shows, etc.) Last week, I took oV work
to go to a Cubs game with a friend. At the ticket booth,
my credit card was declined; I laughed, and asked my
friend to cover it. It was deWnitely the best game I have
ever seen.”
Dependent variables
After reading each description, participants rated the
person on Wve traits including two Wllers and three traits
related to the occupational stereotype. All trait ratings
were made on 7-point scales. Greater stereotyping would
be indicated by higher ratings on the stereotypic traits,
whereas the use of individuating information would be
indicated by lower ratings, since the behavioral informa-
tion in each vignette tended to moderately (although not
extremely) disconWrm the stereotype. We expected no
eVects on the Wller trait ratings.
Results and discussion
A 2 £ 2 £ 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the
trait ratings, with the factors being old versus new
photo (within subjects), counterbalance condition
(between), and stereotype versus Wller traits (within).
We predicted an interaction of photo repetition with
trait type, with the eVect of old versus new photosbeing found only for the stereotypic traits and not for
the Wllers. The predicted interaction was signiWcant,
with F(1, 42) D 5.11, p < .05. To interpret the interac-
tion, ANOVAs were run separately for the stereotypic
and Wller trait ratings. For the stereotypic traits,
the eVect of old versus new photos was signiWcant
with F(1, 42) D 4.92, p < .05. The mean rating on the
stereotypic traits for old (previously seen) photos was
4.88, and for new photos 4.71. Thus, as predicted, the
person descriptions accompanied by previously seen
photos were rated more stereotypically than those
accompanied by novel photos. In contrast, there was
no eVect of old versus new photos for the Wller traits,
F(1, 42) D 0.44, p D .51, means D 3.99 and 4.05.
Exposure is known to increase liking for familiar
objects, in the classic “mere exposure” eVect (Zajonc,
1968). Might the eVect of exposure in this experiment be
due to increased liking, rather than increased stereotyp-
ing? If so, the eVect of exposure would be to make rat-
ings higher for evaluatively positive stereotypes but
lower for negative stereotypes.2 To test this possibility,
we divided the stereotypes into those that were relatively
positive versus negative, based on the valence of the
dependent variable traits on which the stereotypes were
rated. Adding valence as an additional within-subject
factor in the analysis produced little change in the basic
eVect of previous exposure on the stereotype traits
(F(1,42) D 4.78, p < .05). Valence had a strong eVect
(F(1,42) D 28.30, p < .0001), with the more negative ste-
reotypes eliciting more stereotypical ratings than the
positive ones. This valence eVect may indicate that nega-
tive stereotypes had more weight in judgments overall
than positive ones, although the eVect is a function of the
speciWc occupations and descriptions we used and can-
not be unambiguously interpreted. Most important,
valence did not interact with the exposure eVect,
F(1,42) D 1.83, p < .20. Thus, the eVect of old versus new
photos was statistically consistent across the positive
and negative stereotypes. Instead of previous exposure
making ratings of old (compared to new) photos more
positive, previous exposure made the ratings more stereo-
typic, on negative as well as positive stereotype-related
traits. Thus, the results in this study are not due to the
operation of the mere exposure eVect.
Another potential alternative explanation is the sug-
gestion by Mandler, Nakamura, and Van Zandt (1987)
that familiarity might increase ratings on any type of
judgment whatever, including the stereotype traits.
However, this position is contradicted by more recent
evidence that mere exposure leads consistently to
2 The main limiting condition on the increase of liking due to mere
exposure, according to Bornstein’s (1989) meta-analytic review, is
boredom, which can be produced by large numbers of exposures to
very simple stimuli. In this study, a single 3 s exposure to an interesting
stimulus (a human face) should not lead to boredom or disliking.
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1989; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). It is also
inconsistent with our null eVect of familiarity on the
Wller traits.
In summary, this experiment demonstrates that a
brief previous exposure to a subset of information about
a target person (a photo) can increase stereotyping of
that target, even in the presence of counter-stereotypic
individuating information. Exposure had a similar eVect
for both positive and negative stereotypes, eVectively rul-
ing out mere exposure-based positivity as a potential
explanation of the results.
Experiment 2 was designed to further investigate our
hypothesis that repeated exposure to targets makes them
subjectively more familiar, which in turn signals that
extensive processing is not necessary. We replicated the
general design of Experiment 1, adding (for half the par-
ticipants) a question about the subjective familiarity of
each person description before the trait ratings. For par-
ticipants who answer this question, the results should
demonstrate that the previous exposure manipulation
does produce a feeling of familiarity, as predicted. How-
ever, it has been demonstrated (Bornstein & D’Agostino,
1992, 1994; Bornstein, 1989) that explicit awareness that
a stimulus was previously encountered—an awareness
that might be produced by answering the familiarity
question—can undermine the eVect of the previous
exposure on other judgments (e.g., liking). Thus,
responding to the question about familiarity might
reduce or eliminate the eVect of previous exposure on
stereotypicality. However, for the participants who do




Fifty students from the University of California,
Santa Barbara (21 men, 29 women) participated in this
study for partial course credit. Participants responded to
stimuli presented on computer screens using MediaLab
software in individual cubicle spaces. Participants were
randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (repeated exposure:
old versus novel face) £ 2 (perceived familiarity reported
or not) design.
Procedure
As in Study 1, the experiment had 2 phases. In phase
1, participants viewed 30 photos of male faces on a com-
puter monitor (the face images used in this work were
drawn from the CVL FACE DATABASE). Each photo
was displayed for only 3s. Participants were instructed
to try to remember the faces, which they were told wouldbecome relevant in an unspeciWed way later in the exper-
imental session. Order of presentation was randomized
across participants.
Next, the computer informed participants that they
would begin the person perception task. In this phase,
participants sequentially viewed each of six male faces
paired with information about the target’s occupation
and some individuating information. Face-information
pairings were counterbalanced across participants, and
the targets were presented in a random order. Partici-
pants had viewed three of the target photos in the expo-
sure phase (which targets had been exposed was
counterbalanced across participants). Target descrip-
tions were those of the librarian, lawyer, boxer, stock
broker, truck driver, and accountant, described in
Study 1.
Dependent variables
After viewing each face and reading the textual infor-
mation, half of the participants were asked to rate how
familiar each target was using a seven point scale (1D“Not
at all familiar,” 7D“Very familiar”). All participants were
then asked to make trait ratings (Wve traits for each target;
three stereotypical of the target’s occupation plus two Wll-
ers, neutral with respect to category membership) as well as
a general likeability rating. The trait dependent variables
were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were Wnally
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Familiarity
Participants asked to report target familiarity rated
repeatedly exposed targets as more familiar (M D 3.50,
SD D 2.14) than non-repeatedly exposed targets
(M D 2.50, SD D 1.33); F(1, 23) D 85.09, p < .01. Thus even
the brief 3-second previous exposure did make the
repeated faces subjectively more familiar.
Stereotyping
Participants’ ratings of the three stereotypic trait
items for each target were averaged and subjected to a
familiarity report X repeated exposure repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA. Analysis revealed a main eVect of
repeated exposure, F(1, 48) D 8.26, p < .01. Overall,
repeated targets were rated more stereotypically
(M D 3.00, SD D 0.72) than novel targets (M D 2.70,
SD D 0.63). Although the two-way interaction was not
signiWcant, the eVect of previous exposure diVered some-
what between participants who did and those who did
not answer the question about familiarity. Simple main
eVects tests showed that the diVerence between repeated
(M D 3.11) and non-repeated targets (M D 2.72) was sig-
niWcant (F(1,48) D 7.31, p < .01) when participants were
not asked to report familiarity, strongly replicating the
results of Experiment 1. Participants who were asked to
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the same direction (repeatedly exposed targets M D 2.88,
novel targets M D 2.68, F(1,48) D 1.93, p < .18). Thus,
when participants think explicitly about familiarity, they
show a (non-signiWcantly) smaller eVect of repeated
exposure in later judgments, directionally replicating an
eVect that has been demonstrated before (Bornstein &
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994).
Participants’ ratings of the two Wller trait items for
each target were also averaged and subjected to familiar-
ity report £ repeated exposure ANOVAs. As in Experi-
ment 1, we found no diVerences between repeated
exposure condition in trait ratings (F(1, 48) D 1.02, ns;
overall M D 4.07), nor did we Wnd an eVect of reporting
familiarity or an interaction (both Fs < 1). Thus, partici-
pants’ greater stereotyping of repeated targets again was
not due to a general willingness to attribute any traits to
those targets.
Liking
Neither the main eVects of exposure or reporting
familiarity, nor their interaction, had signiWcant eVects
on liking, all Fs < 1. Thus this amount of repetition did
not make targets more likable, further eliminating mere
exposure as a possible mediator of the familiarity-stereo-
typing eVect.
Discussion
First, this study demonstrated that repeated targets
were indeed rated as more familiar than novel targets.
This Wnding lends crucial support to our mediational
hypothesis, that previous exposure produces feelings of
familiarity, which in turn reduce analytic processing and
thereby increase stereotyping. Second, the participants
who were not asked to report familiarity replicated the
results of Experiment 1: previous exposure to photos
increased stereotyping. Thus, this study showed that the
same previous exposure manipulation causes both
increased familiarity and increased stereotyping.
Our hypothesis would be most deWnitively tested by a
mediational analysis, using participants who reported
familiarity to test whether rated familiarity mediates the
eVect of previous exposure on increased stereotyping.
However, within that condition the eVect of previous
exposure on stereotyping was actually not signiWcant,
destroying the possibility of conducting such an analysis.
This Wnding suggests that the act of reporting familiarity
weakens the eVect of previous exposure on judgments of
stereotypicality. Other studies have shown, similarly,
that cues that allow participants to attribute their feel-
ings of familiarity to previous exposures of the stimulus
show weaker eVects of exposure on liking (Bornstein &
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). In a similar vein, Bornstein’s
(1989) meta-analysis showed that subliminal exposures
produce stronger mere exposure eVects than supralimi-nal exposures, consistent with the idea that subliminal
exposures do not allow this type of attribution and cor-
rection process. Our Wnding that reporting familiarity
weakens the eVects of the exposure manipulation on ste-
reotypicality thus falls into line with a considerable body
of prior research, and further implicates familiarity as
the causal mechanism producing the eVect.
The eVect found in Experiment 2 is not due to a gen-
eralized willingness to attribute more of any trait to
repeated targets, but as in Experiment 1 was speciWc to
stereotypic traits. Finally, this eVect was not due to mere
exposure, or generally increased liking for repeated com-
pared to novel targets.
This experiment also provides evidence against yet
another possible alternative explanation, that prior
exposure may increase “social judgeability” (Yzerbyt,
Dardenne, & Leyens, 1998). Social judgeability theory
holds that when perceivers know only the social category
of a target person, they may refrain from making stereo-
typic inferences because they do not feel entitled to make
a judgment on that basis. Observe that our participants
were not in the situation to which social judgeability the-
ory is applicable, the situation of knowing only the tar-
get’s social category. Participants received behavioral
and visual appearance information as well as the social
category (occupation). Nevertheless, one might propose
a novel extension of social judgeability theory to argue
that previous exposure may give perceivers the impres-
sion that they are more entitled to judge the person, free-
ing them to draw more heavily on the stereotype even
though they also have individuating information avail-
able.
In this extended form, social judgeability is a possible
alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 1,
but not Experiment 2. This is because participants who
had their attention explicitly called to the fact of previ-
ous exposure—those who rated the repeated targets as
more familiar—would presumably feel the most entitled
to make stereotypical judgments. However, participants
who rated familiarity showed non-signiWcantly less eVect
of previous exposure on the stereotypicality of their
judgments, contradicting this extended version of the
social judgeability hypothesis.
General discussion
These experiments were designed to test the hypothe-
sis that previous exposure can increase stereotyping, by
discouraging analytic processing. The size of the eVect of
previous exposure on stereotyping is similar in the two
studies, with the eVect size indices d D .31 and .44 respec-
tively, conventionally described as small to medium size
eVects. The experiments provide evidence against three
alternative hypotheses. Exposure can under some cir-
cumstances induce liking (through the classic mere
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tern of our results in either of the experiments. In addi-
tion, previous exposure can lead to social judgeability
and this might also encourage people to stereotype.
However, we obtained evidence against this mediator in
Experiment 2. Finally, Mandler et al. (1987) claimed that
familiarity simply increased ratings on all traits, but nei-
ther of our studies showed increased ratings on irrele-
vant Wller traits.
Why does previous exposure lead to stereotyping? As
Garcia-Marques and Mackie (2001) and others (e.g.,
Johnston & Hawley, 1994) have argued, this eVect makes
sense in terms of an organism’s need to regulate process-
ing eVort. Since people’s cognitive ability to process
information in depth is limited (as assumed in all stan-
dard dual-process models; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), we
have to pick and choose situations and targets on which
to focus extensive processing. Previous exposure is one
reasonable and adaptive cue to use to regulate process-
ing, because our previously gained knowledge should
suYce to deal with previously encountered objects or sit-
uations. We can reserve the eVort of carrying out exten-
sive information-gathering and devising detailed plans
of action for novel objects.
How does a perceiver know that an object has been
previously encountered? The obvious answer is that
previous exposure gives rise to a subjective feeling of
familiarity. Several things can be said about the way
familiarity arises as a function of previous exposure.
First, familiarity can be induced by previous exposure
to the whole body of information to be processed, or to
salient sub-parts. For example, Garcia-Marques and
Mackie (2001) exposed participants to a spoken per-
suasive message and then gave them a written version
of the same message. In the studies in this paper, in
contrast, participants were not repeatedly exposed to
the entire person description that they ultimately
judged, but only to a subset of it, the photo. Second,
feelings of familiarity can result even when the pre-
sented information has not been encountered before in
its exact form, but is similar to previously presented or
previously known information. In the problem-solving
study by Reder and Ritter (1992), for example, some
problems were highly similar to previously-seen
problems.
Third, the eVect of familiarity should not depend on
a conscious recognition by the perceiver that the infor-
mation has been previously encountered, and a strate-
gic decision to withhold processing eVort. Much
research including the seminal “false fame” studies of
Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jas-
echko, 1989) shows that previous exposure can lead to
feelings of familiarity that can inXuence subsequent
judgments, even when the person is unable to con-
sciously recollect the prior exposure. Thus, feelings of
familiarity can be dissociated from recollective judg-ments of previous occurrence (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987;
Mandler et al., 1987). Similarly, we suggest that vague
feelings of familiarity should regulate processing even
when people cannot consciously recognize that they
have encountered the information before. Indeed,
results of our Experiment 2 and Bornstein (1989) sug-
gest that eVects are even stronger when conscious recol-
lection does not occur.
These studies demonstrate that when familiarity oper-
ates to regulate processing, people do not simply give the
familiar information itself less processing. In our experi-
ments the photo was familiar from prior exposure, while
the text in each person description was novel. Still, the
feeling of familiarity led participants to give more weight
to the occupational stereotype (and less to the individu-
ating behavioral information) even though the occupa-
tion was part of the written description, which was
equally novel in all conditions. Our studies Wnd, as the
processing-regulation idea predicts, that the feeling of
familiarity acts as a cue to generally reduce analytic pro-
cessing of entire familiar objects—not just that the famil-
iar subset of the information is given less analytic
processing.
In making this suggestion, we advance what may
appear to be a novel theoretical idea, that analytic pro-
cessing is directed at speciWc stimulus objects, as in the
familiar metaphor of the “attentional spotlight.” This
idea contrasts to the frequent interpretation that per-
ceivers are “in a particular processing mode” (analytic or
heuristic) at each point in time. We believe the latter can-
not be the case. Analytic processing, given its limited-
capacity and sequential nature, can only be focused on a
single object at a time. This means that even as one stim-
ulus is being systematically considered, other perceptu-
ally available objects are not receiving the same type of
intensive processing although they may still serve as heu-
ristic cues. This point may be obscured because typical
research designs only tap processing of a single stimulus
(e.g., a persuasive message) at one time. However, we
believe that it makes no theoretical sense to postulate
that someone “in analytic processing mode” devotes
equal processing eVort to all available objects. Instead,
when as in everyday life people are faced with a large
array of stimuli, we believe that they use the items’ rela-
tive familiarity to regulate processing, adaptively focus-
ing more analytic processing on novel stimuli than on
familiar ones.
The evidence reported in this paper leaves some open
questions, of course. Although we were able to rule out
several alternative hypotheses, we can provide no direct
statistical evidence for familiarity as the mediator of
increased stereotyping, because in Study 2 (as in some
previous research) asking directly about familiarity
weakened the eVect itself. And a question remains about
the breadth of the eVect. Our theory states that familiar-
ity tends to reduce analytic processing, thereby increas-
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presupposes that the stereotype itself can be readily
noted without extensive processing. This assumption is
consistent with the vast majority of the literature on ste-
reotyping, which has focused on categories such as gen-
der, race, or age that have immediate perceptual cues.
But in a situation in which stereotype information is
diYcult to extract, we predict that familiarity would still
lead to less analytic processing, but not necessarily to
more stereotyping. This issue remains for future
research.
How broad are the real-world implications of the
fact that familiarity induced by previous exposure can
lead to stereotyping? In most situations, of course,
familiarity with another person is strongly correlated
with individuated knowledge, aVective bonds of friend-
ship, etc.—factors that obviously tend to work against
stereotyping even if a perceiver is processing non-ana-
lytically. However, when familiarity results from previ-
ous exposure that is unaccompanied by increases in
these other factors (as in these studies), the resulting
increase in stereotypical judgments can be observed.
This type of unconfounding can occur in the real world
as well as in the lab. Illustrating this possibility is a
clever study of the mere exposure eVect by Moreland
and Beach (1992). The researchers arranged for several
women to sit in on varying numbers of sessions of a
large lecture course, where they sat quietly and took
notes, although without interacting with the other stu-
dents. At the end of the course, the other students were
shown photos of the women and asked to make various
ratings about them. The women who had attended the
course more often—who were more familiar—were
liked better and rated as more attractive, more intelli-
gent, and generally more positive. The eVect of famil-
iarity on stereotyping, for which we have presented
evidence in this paper, has additional implications. The
women who were seen more often would likely have
been rated as more emotional, more nurturant, more
talkative, more dependent—in other words, in more
female-stereotypical ways—on negative as well as posi-
tive aspects of the female stereotype. When common-
place situations such as seeing someone in a class
numerous times over a semester can cause perceptions
to become more stereotypic, it is a thought-provoking
reminder of both the insidiousness and potency of ste-
reotypes.
Broadening this idea, our results have another impli-
cation for real-world encounters with members of other
groups. Psychologists long assumed that intergroup con-
tact in the form of simple acquaintance would be suY-
cient to reduce prejudice (Amir, 1976). However, current
thinking is that more intimate contact leading to true
friendship is the key to reducing prejudice (Pettigrew,
1998). Our Wndings may suggest one reason for this fact:
incidental contact, in the absence of more intimate famil-iarity, knowledge, and aVective bonds, may actually tend
to increase people’s stereotyping of those they come in
contact with.
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